PLANNING FOR SECURITY

An Alternative Defense Plan for Western Europe and the Pacific Countries

Bent Sørensen

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Abstract

The paper evaluates the security implications of the present defense postures of Western Europe and of the Pacific, finding in both cases a declining trend in security. Upon this background, alternatives are sought, which through a stepwise reorganization of defense postures may improve security without transitional setbacks. These steps involve removal of tactical nuclear arms (deployed or in transit) from the regions concerned, a gradual decoupling from the military policies of the superpowers, then a transition to a less offensive conventional defense, and finally a move towards a nuclear-free and demilitarized world. It is argued, that both with respect to the formation of nuclear-free zones and with respect to the process of decoupling from superpower interests, Western Europe and the Pacific countries may gain from coordination and collaboration in these matters.
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1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of maintaining a defense is to provide society with security: security against war and destruction, security against foreign occupation, coercion or pressure. Democracy includes the right for members of a society to receive inspiration from the outside, but the difference between inspiring and interfering is usually clear. A distinction may be made between outside pressures from individual nations (which are regarded as negative) and pressures from the "world community", such as sanctions against belligerent nations (which are regarded as positive, at least by the majority supporting them).

By superpower I shall understand a nation which maintains a global network of "regions of interest", i.e. geographical areas, in which that nation regards it as its "right" to interfere. Superpower behaviour may include imperialism, i.e. the use of coercion for maintaining access to the resources of other countries. Superpower behaviour involves using military forces for purposes other than security as defined above. For example, the U.S. military is assigned duties which may involve interfering in Middle East countries, in case oil supplies to the Western countries seem threatened. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are engaged in a competition aimed at increasing their respective shares of "regions of interest", particularly in the Third World.

2. WESTERN EUROPE:
A CALL FOR CHANGE

The traditional threat perception in Western Europe involves a Soviet invasion through the East-West German border, carried through by swift tank and personal movements similar to the methods used by Nazi-Germany in World War II. As so often in
history, our military planning is directed at avoiding the mistakes of the last war. The fight against the invading Warsaw Pact forces is assumed to start as a conventional war, but with the NATO countries being the first to use (tactical) nuclear arms, in case large concentrations of enemy troops appear to be able to break through our lines. Once nuclear weapons have been used, it is likely that the other side will also use theirs, and depending on the scale of such use, NATO will escalate its use of nuclear arms to attack targets further behind enemy lines and eventually may decide to hit population centers. This "controlled" escalation is denoted as a flexible response, and its stepwise escalation continues until the level of all-out strategic nuclear war is reached. It is further assumed, that expressing the will to go through such a rapid nuclear escalation constitutes a deterrence sufficient to ensure that the enemy never takes the first step of invasion, and that consequently nuclear war in Europe will never actually happen.

The possibility that the Soviet Union will attempt an invasion into Western Europe must be described as exceedingly small, for both military and political reasons. Even in a purely conventional war, Soviet military experts must feel very uncertain regarding the outcome, due to Western leadership in areas such as electronic equipment, which may outweigh the Soviet advantage in numbers of tanks and troops (valid in the early stages of a conflict, assuming that Western reinforcement forces have not yet arrived). If nuclear weapons are used, most of the European land surface will for years become useless for any purpose, so no political purpose of occupation can be justified.
There is another picture of threat, which may be as important as the standard invasion scenario. It considers a Soviet attack on Western Europe unlikely as an isolated act, but possible in connexion with a broader conflict, which the Soviet leaders sees as impossible to contain. By fear (founded or not) that a global nuclear war cannot be avoided, the Soviet leaders may in such a situation opt for the possible advantage of striking first. The chain of events could for example include a local conflict in important Middle East oil producing region, then the intervention of both the U.S. (rapid deployment force) and the Soviet Union (which has as large an oil supply problem as the West), and the use of (a limited number of) nuclear weapons in the conflict. The use of nuclear weapons to back the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force is a clear possibility, considering the small size of the unit and the reaction at home, should the force become trapped in an untenable position. It seems unlikely, that the superpowers should let such a situation escalate into a nuclear war, but unforeseen circumstances may increase the probability in a real situation. If the nuclear escalation is as probable (or as improbable) as nuclear war in Western Europe, then the initiating event (Middle East war) is substantially more likely than that of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. The picture of the Soviet Union seeing an advantage of a first strike against Western Europe and possibly against the U.S., in case it sees a large nuclear war as unavoidable, calls for a reassessment of our defense posture. Maybe it could be modified in such a way that no such advantage would remain, without being less effective in other respects.
While the invasion theory follows conventional Clausewitz views of war as a rational act in continuation of other political measures, then the nuclear war scenario outlined above considers the use of nuclear arms as a desperate act of a nuclear power pushed beyond limits of rational control or - which amounts to the same - a nuclear power believing to have lost control of the situation.

A West European defense policy aiming at reducing the possibility of such nuclear madness must focus not only on the security of Western Europe, but must also try to diminish the likelihood of the Soviet Union doing desperate things. In other words, West European defense should aim at improving Soviet security, not at lowering it.

Seen in this light, previous and current defense policies of the NATO alliance must be characterized as total failures. Each step in the spiralling arms race has tried to improve security on one side by lowering the security of the other side (more megatonnage, higher precision, faster missiles and shortened reaction times). After each new development and the countermeasure by the other part, both have come out less secure than before. This article will argue that there are alternatives which do improve our security without lowering that of the other side. Since many of the alternatives have already been suggested by many other people, one has to ask, why they were not taken seriously. The obvious answer is that the arms race has a purpose different from that of providing security for people. The arms race has served well in reinforcing the superpower status of both the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R., even if the security of the population in the two
countries, and particularly that of their European allies, has
diminished in the process.

This is why Western Europe is more obviously in need of an
altered defense policy than the U.S., and it is also the reason
why establishing an alternative defense policy is so difficult: It
requires a substantial measure of disengagement from the
interests of the United States, a disengagement which the U.S.
cannot comprehend and probably will try to counteract in a
number of ways.

3. THE PACIFIC:

A CALL FOR CHANGE

By the Pacific countries I shall understand Australia and the
island communities from Japan in the North and New Zealand in the
South to Easter Island in the East. The defense of several Pacific
nations, including Japan and most of the small island communities,
has since World War II been assumed by outside powers, notably
the United States. The ANZUS Treaty is a defense agreement
between the United States, Australia and New Zealand, and the
post-war constitution imposed on Japan by the U.S. allows Japan
only a selfdefense force, a concept originally being interpreted
as a non-offensive, paramilitary force but gradually being eroded
to allow for a regular, modern army with certain restrictions in
the types of weapons and weapon platforms it may possess. Several
of the Pacific countries host important military bases, ports or
other military installations serving the U.S. forces. As a result
of this relationship, the perceived security threat is primarily
that of a Soviet intrusion into the area, while conflicts with South-Eastern Asiatic countries are a second priority and conflicts with South American nations are considered highly improbable. It should be remembered, that the vast waters of the Pacific is penetrated by a truly internationally composed fleet of sea vessels, including the U.S. and U.S.S.R. nuclear submarines playing a central role in the global military posture of the superpowers and in their policies of mutual deterrence. The Pacific also has been and still is a testing ground for new weapon systems, including missile shots by both superpowers and the underground nuclear testing conducted by France in Eastern Polynesia.

As in the case of Western Europe, actual invasion of Pacific territory by either the Soviet Union and its allies or by China is an extremely remote possibility. Again the most realistic threat perception would involve conflicts outside the region, which would cause the Soviet Union to attempt a blow towards the U.S. military installations in the Pacific region, because of the role they are playing in any superpower confrontation. If submarine vulnerability increases from its present low level, any confrontation between the superpowers will also involve substantial targeting of open sea positions in the Pacific Ocean.

What I have said regarding Western Europe can be said even stronger for the Pacific countries: The presence of U.S. weapons and military facilities may be the largest security risk in the area. An alternative defense policy for the nations involved should attempt to remove this security risk, and would then have
to deal with the secondary risks emerging when the U.S. presence is toned down. The superpower competition takes place, in the Pacific as well as in Europe, at the expense of the security of the populations.

4. THE APPROACH

Arms reduction has been the subject of numerous conferences, negotiations and summit meetings. None have succeeded, although some may have slowed down the arms race a bit. When the escalation in weapon deployment and in ideological rhetoric has been at its peaks, quite substantial public movements have risen and demanded changes in defense policy. Demands have included a total stop for nuclear tests, no first use of nuclear weapons, the abolition of all nuclear arms or at least the formation of nuclear-free zones, denial of port calls from ships that may carry nuclear arms, change of conventional forces to a non-offensive type or to a purely civil defense, and the advancement of global development plans which could remove the causes of conflicts.

These suggestions are rejected by most of the military establishment, which argues that a cross-the-board capability is the best warranty against attacks, the nature of which may be unanticipated, and that weakening our defense would invite invasions or attempts at political coercion, and finally that the Soviet Union is founded upon an expansionist ideology, so that the only way of communicating with the Soviet leaders is through demonstrations of strength.

The alternative defense plan proposed in this paper is based on
the belief that both the peace groups and the generals possess a piece of the truth. A bridge must be built between the truth that nuclear arms can only destroy what they were supposed to defend, and the truth that a unilateral weakening of defense may invite foreign interference into internal affairs.

The suggestion is to carry out the reorganization of defense in a carefully chosen sequence of modest steps. This leaves time for assessment of the security impact of each step, and most importantly, it leaves time for the adversary to indicate satisfaction with the step taken, either by acting in reciprocity or by another sign of appreciation. This makes it possible to avoid fruitless negotiations. Each step may be taken unilaterally, and the subsequent step may be postponed till the other side has reacted in a positive way. Alternatively, the goodwill created by the initial steps in this process may make it meaningful to engage in negotiations, which can then be built on trust rather than on fear. As noted above, each step must improve the security of the other part without deteriorating one's own security. This has to be the guiding principle for selecting the steps to be taken as part of the alternative defense plan, and for identifying those responses from the opponent that will allow each subsequent step to be taken.

5. WESTERN EUROPE:

FIRST THINGS FIRST

The analysis made above identifies two most important security threats against Western Europe: The abundant presence of nuclear arms on its soil, and the conflict-prone dependence on raw
materials imported from unstable regions outside Europe, notably Middle East oil. The top priority policy changes would thus be removal of land-based nuclear weapons, and carrying out an energy policy aimed at substitution of oil by less vulnerable sources, or by improvements in the efficiency of energy use.

The changes relative to current policy are obvious. Today we maintain both a strategic nuclear deterrence, of which the submarine-based part is least vulnerable, and a tactical nuclear capacity involving battlefield weapons envisaged to become used against tanks and personnel, as well as intermediate range missile weapons to be used for deep strikes against enemy follow-on forces. The possible first use of tactical nuclear weapons in a European war is suicide and it may invite nuclear first strikes by the Soviet, rather than serve as a deterrent. Having recognized this, it is evident that a unilateral removal of European based, tactical nuclear arms (whether owned by the U.S. or by European countries) is precisely a measure, which can improve our security and at the same time improve the security of the Warsaw Pact. They no longer have to worry about having to make rash decisions on whether or not to risk a first nuclear strike, because the situation which creates this dilemma no longer can occur except when strategic missiles have already been fired. We no longer have to fear first strikes based on Soviet miscalculations, and in a European conflict, the selfdestructive use of any tactical nuclear arms retained by the enemy is highly unlikely, because using them would entail a strategic retaliation since this is our only option left.
Thus both sides gain security by our unilateral step. However, it would be natural to expect a reciprocated act by the Soviet Union, i.e. that of removing its tactical nuclear arms directed at Western Europe. They serve no purpose after the West has abandoned such weapons, and the Warsaw Pact does not feel inferior in the balance of the conventional arms, which would remain after all of Europe had been made a nuclear-free zone.

As for oil substitution, this is already ongoing, but primarily based on purely economic calculations of the maximum investment to be devoted to such substitution. The indirect advantage of lowering the negative security impact of conflicts in the oil producing regions could allow for a substantially faster investment in oil substitution.

The strategic deterrence force available to Western Europe presently comprises British and French weapons with a national role, plus the "umbrella" offered by the U.S. If superpower interests cause the U.S. to react in a negative way upon the formation of a nuclear-free zone in Europe, e.g. by withdrawing the strategic umbrella, then the question of an independent, West European strategic nuclear force has to be raised. The military side of its establishment is easy, because the role of the British and French submarine-based arms could simply be extended to constitute a new umbrella for all of the West-European NATO countries. Politically, this would cause more subtle problems, but discussions on an extended role of the French strategic force have already taken place between France and West Germany.
Once the tactical nuclear arms have been removed on both sides of the European front line, the question of a suitable next step of disarmament gains actuality. Such a step could be a mutual removal of those parts of the conventional defense, which are suited only for attack. It is a difficult task to rate the offensive or non-offensive character of individual weapon systems (important factors being range and mobility), and negotiations may prove useful in this situation, after the creation of a nuclear-free zone has already created a healthy climate for reaching agreements. It may be proposed to look at the overall posture of conventional defense, rather than at individual weapon systems. One suggested non-offensive defense system is the area defense, a highly decentralized defense of low mobility, armed with precision guided antitank and antiaircraft munition of limited range. Modern electronic communication systems should make it possible to retain command and control over such a decentralized type of defense. Long range missiles and air carriers would be banned, and the negotiations should aim at significant reductions in tank forces, which should reach parity or better should be totally abandoned. Certain elements of the area defense could be introduced unilaterally, but reciprocity is a condition for a complete reformation of the conventional forces into a non-offensive posture.

6. PACIFIC COUNTRIES:

FIRST THINGS FIRST

A primary threat to the security of the Pacific countries is also a conflict which originates elsewhere and leads to nuclear war. Obvious nuclear targets in the Pacific region are the U.S. nuclear
weapon sites in Hawaii and other U.S. bases and military facilities abundant across the region. To remove these installations would play a role similar to the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from the European land area.

One distinct difference between the European and the Pacific situation is that there is no clear border line with Soviet arms on one side and Western arms on the other side. The two superpowers are both present in the vast, international waters of the Pacific Ocean, but most of the land areas are allied to the U.S.

The nuclear arms deployed in the Pacific are highly concentrated. Indeed, most of the island communities and the three larger land masses of Australia, New Zealand and Japan are already nuclear-free in the same sense as the Scandinavian countries. The declaration of the whole Pacific minus U.S. territory as a nuclear-free zone can thus be effectuated unilaterally without having to worry about a corresponding Soviet step. The submarine-based nuclear weapons are a different matter, and the questions they raise would have to be kept aside until a strategic arms reduction becomes a realistic proposal. The same is true for the strategic arms in the Atlantic-European region.

The question of tactical nuclear arms stationed in the Soviet Union is of interest to Japan, and of vital interest to China. If China and the Soviet Union would agree on removing tactical nuclear arms on both sides, this would have strongly positive security implications, also for the entire Pacific region. A
nuclear-free zone involving China and Soviet would improve security in this region as much as the similar zone in Europe improves security there. The Chinese have ample conventional forces to defend their territory against Soviet invasion, and the better equipped Soviet forces should also in the absence of tactical nuclear weapons be able to deter the Chinese from invading. Furthermore, the strategic deterrence remains, so that both countries have an ultimate guarantee against conventional attacks from the other side.

As in Europe, the next step following the formation of a nuclear-free zone in the Pacific might be a reorganization of the conventional defense to exclude the offensive elements. Most of the Pacific island communities have no forces that may be construed as offensive. The most urgent problem would be that of Japan, which for a long time renounced on offensive components in its self-defense force, but now seems to be moving away from this attitude. The Japanese government appears to have given in to U.S. pressure, urging Japan to prepare for an offensive role in South-East Asia (particularly through its air forces).

The step towards a non-offensive conventional posture thus involves a certain disengagement from U.S. policy, particularly by Japan, and similar to what is required in the European case. The South-East Asian countries bordering the Pacific Ocean would have to proceed in a similar direction, along with Australia and New Zealand. A very significant step forward would be a China-Soviet move towards non-offensive conventional postures, a step which other Asian nations could not easily avoid following, once an
opinion pressure has been formed both in the Pacific and in China, the Soviet Union and the rest of Europe.

7. NEW PARTNERSHIPS

Although many political leaders both in Western Europe and in the Pacific countries have realized the advantage of abolishing nuclear weapons, few have dared to do anything about it. The reasons include uncertainty regarding the future of the existing defence alliances, and fear that the U.S. will not appreciate an alternative nuclear policy and may actively counteract it. The reason is that current nuclear defense policies are perceived by the superpowers to serve their superpower interests, while the proposed alternatives involve a decoupling process which is perceived as hurting superpower economic and ideological interests in the regions involved.

The point of view taken in this article is, that the security risk for Western Europe and the Pacific countries are virtually non-existent except as an indirect consequence of a superpower confrontation. Basing the defense policy on the quest for maximum security for the populations and for the chosen form of society leads to a disengagement from superpower rivalries. As viewed from the point of view of the superpowers, this entails a loss of influence, including loss of overseas bases, weapon deployment sites and platforms for military operations. The declaration of a nuclear-free zone in Western Europe involves the removal of all U.S. nuclear arms stationed in Europe. The U.S. has already stated, that "lack of West European will to do what is necessary for its defense" may make the U.S. withdraw its troops stationed in
Germany (with the purpose of convincing the Soviet Union of U.S. involvement in any European conflict). Such a withdrawal would contribute positively to lowering West European security risks, if the identification of superpower rivalry as the major security risk is correct. However, the U.S. commitment in Europe has also served the United States in economic terms. It is thus a possibility, that economic pressures will be applied by the U.S. against a Western Europe trying to go its own way with respect to security policy. This indeed happened when Western Europe decided to establish a natural gas pipeline connection to the Soviet Union.

Similar threats of economic repressions may be launched against any Pacific country trying to disengage from U.S. defense policies. Both Western Europe and the Pacific countries have developed a substantial technology dependence upon the United States (in fields such as passenger airplanes and microelectronics), and would become hurt if the U.S. were to stop export of the commodities in question. Several countries in Western Europe, as well as Australia, could have avoided much of this dependence by indigenous production of key products of strategic relevance. They chose not to do so, because the cost would have been higher. The corresponding U.S. products could be offered at a lower price due to the large volume sales already ensured by their home market. In most areas competing industries do exist, e.g. in Western Europe, so that the problem posed by a U.S. embargo would vanish with time. Still, in the short run, existing equipment would be totally dependent on replacement parts from the U.S. or on licences to produce such parts.
Of course the U.S. may not react so negatively against its allies, yet in order to accomplish the change in defense policy, the countries involved must have worked out a plan for the possibility of an economic boycott. In this respect, it seems worthwhile to point out the outstanding technological and economic strength of the combined West European and Pacific region, and hence the advantage that a coordinated planning could bring about. High standards of education, cross-the-board technological knowledge, access to relevant minerals and possession of leading expertise in several microelectronics fields are characteristics of Western Europe, Australia and Japan. Together these countries can deal with a U.S. embargo on export of high technology, by swift substitute production of components and in the longer range by independent development and production of all strategically relevant products. The European and Pacific countries have a sufficient combined economic strength to endure a forced cut off from the U.S. economy, although a smoother decoupling process would of course be highly preferable.

The political process of forming a defense policy that disengages Western Europe and the Pacific countries from the United States may also gain from coordination of the various steps to be taken.

8. THE LONG-TERM FUTURE
An alliance of thought reaching from Western Europe to the Pacific would expose the madness of the current arms race on land, sea and in space, by demonstrating a working alternative. If these regions improve their security by banning tactical nuclear
arms and offensive, conventional weapons, and at the same time make the superpowers more secure, then the stage may be set for more profound disarmament steps. The remaining strategic nuclear arms mainly serve as an ultimate deterrent against invasion and occupation by the ideologically opposed superpower. The two superpowers themselves are well enough separated not to have to fear invasion by the other one, so the remaining purpose of the long-range nuclear missiles must be to protect allies (such as Western Europe and Japan in the case of the United States), and of course to serve as a countermeasure against an attempt by one superpower to use its strategic nuclear missiles in a first strike against the rival superpower itself.

Suppose that the superpower allies on both sides decide that strategic nuclear arms are not the best way of protecting them against foreign invasion! A straightforward comparison of the levels of security obtained by the nuclear deterrence and by other means should settle the question. The nuclear option is a threat to commit suicide rather than sustain foreign occupation. Alternatives may be to use the non-offensive, conventional area defense described above to oppose an attempt of invasion. The probability that this works out and allows the occupying forces to become expelled is of course less than a hundred percent. Yet chances of surviving in freedom are much higher than after a nuclear war. For those that may survive a nuclear exchange, foreign domination is much more probable after the war than before, due to disruption of social organization, so nuclear arms cannot in any sense of the word provide security.
A suitable continuation of the alternative defense policies of Western Europe and the Pacific countries would thus be to call upon a world conference aiming at the complete abolition of nuclear weapons, both those of the superpowers and also those of other existing or prospective nuclear powers. The chances that such negotiations may succeed are much higher after the formation of nuclear-free zones in several parts of the world, and after emphasis has been placed on non-offensive defense in such regions.

In a nuclear-free world there may still exist numerous causes for conflict: social inequities within and between nations, cultural or ideological fundamentalism of the missionary variety, historically based belligerence, etc. Furthermore, the military institutions in many countries exert political influence in a way not reflecting majority views or interests. Conflicts arising from any combination of these factors are fuelled by arms merchants, who contribute to conflict escalation both by offering excessive access to weapons and - as weapons are bought - by a distortion of economic development which in itself may lead to new conflicts.

Countermeasures against these problems may include organized conflict prevention and demilitarization. As regards demilitarization, the area defense is one working example of a type of defense organization, which could as well be made to work in a civilian as in a military framework. Its decentralized structure suits civil or militia based organization and management, without loss of efficiency.

The most urgent step that the international community could take
in favour of conflict prevention would be a total stop for international trade in offensive weapons. Defining which weapons that are to be considered offensive is delicate, both on principal grounds and in practical terms, because weapons such as machine guns that might be considered defensive if purchased by an isolated Pacific island, would not necessarily be so for a nation in the Middle East or on the African continent, engaged in frequent armed conflicts with neighbouring countries. The more clean-cut proposal of a total stop for any arms trade is also less realistic, and it may be undesirable if it would prevent the transition to non-offensive weapons in areas such as Western Europe and the Pacific (considering that there are nations in these regions which do not have any military manufacturing capability and do not want to form one).

This suggests that a prohibition of offensive arms dealing should be monitored by some international organization. Experience with the United Nations organization in this role is not encouraging, due to U.N.'s lack of concrete power and its dependency on superpower veto rights and on economic support from affluent nations. However, once a nuclear-free world has been established, the nations may be more motivated to deal with such issues. The price for security and disarmament must include a willingness to carry through sanctions against countries or groups within countries, which choose to remain belligerent.

Such a new "world order" is unthinkable in case the economic exploitation of weak countries continues. A new economic world order may cost the rich countries as much as they now spend on
military defense. The money would be spent on conflict prevention rather than on conflict "treatment". Still, conflicts may continue to arise as long as disparities between nations exist, and also for the several non-economic reasons stated. Thus, a move towards demilitarization must be accompanied by an upgrading of the international collaboration, including the particular task of coordinating sanctions against belligerent nations, and perhaps giving the U.N. increased access to conducting military interventions (using internationally composed forces), e.g. against violators of the arms trade regulations. Efforts in this direction has until now been ineffective, particularly because the two superpowers have intervened in a number of foreign countries while at the same time preventing the international community from interfering through the United Nations.

It should be clear that general conflict prevention and demilitarization are long-term goals which may never be reached. The important thing for an alternative defense policy is that it contains far-reaching visions and that there is a succession of manageable steps, which gradually improve the security of people across the world, and which proceed continuously towards the ultimate goal of a peaceful Earth, secure to man and to mankind.
ALTERNATIVE DEFENSE PLAN:

1985-1990: All tactical nuclear arms are removed from Western Europe, including air-launched and U.S. owned weapons. The Pacific region is declared a nuclear-free zone, U.S. territory excepted.

1990-1995: The Warsaw Pact nations remove tactical and intermediate distance nuclear weapons from the European scene and starts negotiations with China on a nuclear-free zone along their common border. Defensive weapons for area defense are introduced in several countries, and are being tried out in combat exercises.

1995-2000: Offensive weapon components are definitively removed from the defense systems in Europe, the Soviet Union, China and the Pacific area. This time the U.S. agrees to include its Pacific territory.

2000-2010: A world conference works out a plan for an ordered elimination of all remaining nuclear weapons, for banning international trade in offensive weapons, and for establishing international guarantees against future violations of the treaty, backed by a rapidly deployable force, e.g. composed of units from the former nuclear powers. The proposed treaty gains support from all the nuclear powers and most other countries, and it is decided to make it effective also against non-signatory nations.

2010 and onwards: The nuclear weapons have now all been dismantled. The world conference continues its efforts to establish a new economic world order and to encourage demilitarization. Progress is slow...
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